Necessary and sufficient factors in employee downsizing?:A qualitative comparative analysis of lay-offs in France and the UK, 2008–2013 by Goyer, Michel et al.
 
 
Necessary and sufficient factors in employee
downsizing?
Goyer, Michel; Clark , Ian ; Bhankaraully, Shabneez
DOI:
10.1111/1748-8583.12101
License:
Other (please specify with Rights Statement)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Goyer, M, Clark , I & Bhankaraully, S 2016, 'Necessary and sufficient factors in employee downsizing? A
qualitative comparative analysis of lay-offs in France and the UK, 2008–2013', Human Resource Management
Journal, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 252-268. https://doi.org/10.1111/1748-8583.12101
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Necessary and sufficient factors in employee downsizing? A qualitative comparative
analysis of lay-offs in France and the UK, 2008–2013, which has been published in final form at 10.1111/1748-8583.12101. This article may
be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 1 
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  A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Layoffs in France and the United Kingdom,                        
                                                             2008-2013 
 
                            Michel Goyer, Ian Clark and Shabneez Bhankaraully  
 
Abstract 
 
Embedded in the literature on financialization and institutional approaches, this study is an 
examination of the causal factors of employee downsizing in two institutionally dissimilar 
settings, France and the United Kingdom, using the fuzzy sets variant of QCA (fsQCA). The 
findings show that the roughly equivalent use of large-scale layoffs in the two countries is 
coupled with strikingly different causal factors. Our argument suggests the importance of 
complex causation whereby employee downsizing reflects the growing influence of financial 
considerations in the governance of companies, but its diffusion across countries is shaped by 
different configurations of institutional arrangements.  
 
Keywords 
Complex Causation, Employee Downsizing, Financialization, Fuzzy Sets QCA, Institutional 
Investors, Institutions, Leverage, Ownership Structures 
Introduction      
This article examines causal factors behind large scale employee downsizing in two different 
settings, France and the United Kingdom, from 2008 to 2013. Our theoretically-informed 
comparative study contributes to important debates in two literature sets: those on 
financialization and comparative institutionalism. Financialization refers to the increased 
importance of financial considerations in the governance of companies which prioritizes the 
interests of investor-owners, which is shareholder value (van der Zwan, 2014). This greater 
prominence of finance is made possible by important structural developments in the global 
economy, most notably removal of controls on capital movements across borders and the 
growth in the financial assets of shareholder value driven funds. These developments have 
resulted in unprecedented amounts of capital chasing profitable investment opportunities 
(Engelen and Konings, 2010; see also Krippner, 2005). At firm-level, financialization 
highlights how the ascendancy of shareholder value entails an important reorganization of 
resource allocation aimed at keeping stock prices high and returning cash flows to 
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shareholders. In the context of investor and shareholder value, recourse to employee 
downsizing constitutes a popular strategy used by companies to generate resources that are 
then distributed to shareholders (Applebaum and Batt, 2014; Clark, 2013; Jacoby, 2005).  
        Our second contribution is to the literature on comparative institutional analysis. 
Institutional approaches constitute mid-range theory that aims to illustrate how conflict over 
resources and strategic choices are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take 
place (Hall, 1986; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Institutional arrangements matter because they 
enable, and constrain, different firm-level actors (managers, shareholders and workers) in 
their competing claims over the allocation of resources and, more broadly, over the 
governance of the firm (Campbell, 2004; Whitley, 1999). That is, institutions structure power 
relations inside companies that, in turn, strengthen the ability of different actors to advance 
their interests against others with different preferences (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Hall, 
1986; see also Goergen et al., 2013 for downsizing). Incorporating institutional analyses into 
the study of employment relations is insightful in order to account for the diffusion of 
financialization, a highly redistributive phenomenon, across different countries.  
         Our argument, in respect of employee downsizing, centres on the necessity of situating 
HR strategies within a corporate context that incorporates both the priorities of 
financialization within firms and the importance of institutional diversity across national 
business systems. To effectively address this challenge, we incorporate into our analysis 
theoretical insights developed across the social sciences that highlight the importance of 
complex causation in understanding outcomes, such as the implementation of large-scale 
employee layoffs (Mahoney, 2004; Ragin, 1987). From an ontological standpoint, our 
argument illustrates how the implementation of employee downsizing across national settings 
is not generated by the presence of one single cause applicable to all national business 
systems. Rather, downsizing occurs as the result of configurations of specific conditions that 
differ across national settings. The presence of institutional diversity, while not constituting 
an obstacle to the diffusion of shareholder value practices as correctly asserted by 
financialization approaches, provides revealing insights enabling us to assess which sets of 
conditions will be necessary and/or sufficient to generate a similar outcome, namely 
 3 
 
employee downsizing, across institutionally different economies (Braumoeller, 2003; Goyer, 
2011: 106-128).  
         The diffusion of financial considerations across national settings is shaped by the extent 
to which institutional arrangements enable actors to implement, or resist, employee 
downsizing. In the institutionally constrained context of the French economy, the presence of 
several ‘conducive’ factors is required for large-scale layoffs to take place. In the 
institutionally permissive context of the UK economy, in contrast, the implementation of 
employee downsizing schemes will be easier as reflected by the presence of less demanding 
configurations of specific factors. Drawing from the literature on comparative corporate 
governance (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Gospel and Pendleton, 2014; Gourevitch and Shinn, 
2005; Roe, 2000), we develop our theoretical framework by examining the impact of three 
financialized variables on the implementation of large-scale downsizing schemes: financial 
leverage; categories of institutional investor; and ownership structures of companies. 
         This article is structured as follows. The first part looks at two theoretical perspectives 
that provide important contextual insights for the study of employee downsizing: 
financialization and institutional approaches. Part two integrates financialization and 
institutional approaches into our framework of complex causation. This integration leads to a 
complex and comprehensive understanding of the increased prominence of financial 
considerations in the governance of companies across different institutional settings. We also 
outline how Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a research method best captures 
notions of complex causation. Part three presents the foundations of the QCA methodology. 
Part four reports on our data sample. Part five reveals our empirical findings and part six 
contains a discussion and conclusion on our findings and the contribution of our research to 
theory building.   
 
 
Employee Downsizing in Advanced Capitalist Economies: Competing Theoretical 
Approaches 
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Financialization constitutes an important theoretical perspective that provides key insights for 
the investigation of employee downsizing, an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in 
contemporary capitalism (Clark, 2009; Thompson, 2011). The prominence of financial 
considerations in the governance of companies has been made possible by important 
structural changes in the global economy: the liberalization of capital flows across borders 
and the growth in the financial assets of shareholder value driven funds – especially those 
based in the United Kingdom and in the United States (Engelen and Konings, 2010). As a 
result, an unprecedented amount of capital is moving across international financial markets in 
search for liquid and profitable investment opportunities. At the firm-level, financialization 
refers to the ascendancy of shareholder value as the guiding star for firm strategy 
that prioritizes the interests of shareholders at the expense of other actors in the corporation, 
most notably employees, thereby resulting in a major redistribution of wealth (van der Zwan, 
2014; see also Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Jacoby, 2005). In liberal market economies, the 
unbridled pursuit of shareholder value means that new financial objectives, for example high 
stock prices and maximizing the release of cash flows to shareholders, are being pursued at 
the expense of other goals – and very often via the breach of implicit contracts with 
employees (Appelbaum, Baum and Clark, 2013; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014).  
         The implementation of employee downsizing is central in this redistributive process. 
Shareholder value driven objectives are often secured by the implementation of corporate 
policies that allocate resources away from employees – most notably dividend payouts, a 
focus on core competencies, share buybacks, and the introduction of a financial performance 
matrix such as return on equity (Brav et al., 2008; Kahan and Rock, 2007). Yet, the 
implementation of employee downsizing schemes does not contribute to the innovative 
capabilities of the firm as revenues generated from these layoffs are not reinvested. The 
(potential) productivity gains of ‘financialized’ firms are appropriated by shareholder value 
driven investors at the expense of retained profit for further investment in innovation 
(Applebaum and Batt, 2014; Goergen et al., 2014; Jacoby, 2005). Therefore, as highlighted in 
this journal, incorporating financialization as a new structural development into the analysis 
of employment relations is paramount given the traditional focus of HRM approaches around 
concepts of high performance work systems that neglect the increased influence of finance, 
(Thompson, 2011: 361). 
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        A conceptual challenge for the theorization of financialization, however, is to account 
for the diffusion of this new business model across institutionally dissimilar business 
systems. By (correctly) emphasizing structural developments as crucial factors in newly 
prominent financial considerations, these approaches place less emphasis on the contingent 
character of their introduction in specific contexts. Because of its heavily redistributive 
character, the diffusion of financialization across countries is not a neutral process but one 
characterized by conflict where intricacies therein remain to be investigated (Gourevitch and 
Shinn, 2005; Goyer, 2011). For instance, two studies on downsizing in non-liberal market 
economies, Munoz-Bullon et al (2014) on Spain and Ahmadian and Robinson (2001) on 
Japan, illustrate the importance of institutional isomorphic pressures that encourage 
companies to implement employee downsizing whenever other ‘leading’ firms adopt this 
practice. That is, the introduction of employee downsizing as a shareholder value practice in 
these two economies raised issues of institutional legitimacy as companies felt comfortable in 
implementing employee downsizing schemes only as followers. As recently noted, therefore, 
an important challenge is to understand how the increased prominence of financialization 
translates into workplace outcomes across different business systems (Thompson and 
Cushen, 2015). 
          A second theoretical perspective for the study of employee downsizing is the literature 
on comparative institutional analysis. Institutional approaches are conceptualized as mid-
level variables, as distinct from macro-structures, that act as mid-range theory (Hall, 1986; 
Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Institutionally-based scholars do not advance the notion that only 
institutions matter for outcomes. Rather institutional analyses aim to account for how conflict 
over resources and strategic choices by actors are mediated by the institutional setting in 
which they take place (Campbell 2004; Whitley, 1999). Institutional analyses are also often 
built around a specific research design, namely how the presence of institutional differences 
account for observed variations in an outcome variable of interest (Dobbin, 1994). From a 
methodological perspective, therefore, institutional approaches aim to explain variations 
within a class of phenomenon based on the presence of institutional differences that, in turn, 
makes it difficult to conceptualize how and why exogenous structural developments occur 
(Krippner, 2005).  
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         Institutional approaches are, however, better suited to explain the diffusion of 
financialization across national settings. The redistributive character of the financialization 
process serves as a reminder that the corporation remains a contested entity with different 
actors making divergent claims regarding its governance (Campbell, 2004; Whitley, 1999). In 
this context, the transposition of the preferences of actors into outcomes, and their ability to 
defend their interests against other actors with opposing preferences, constitutes a process 
that is shaped by institutional arrangements which structure power relations (Dobbin, 1994; 
Hall, 1986). For instance, a decision to introduce employee downsizing schemes might take 
place at the firm-level but does not occur in an institutional vacuum. Institutional 
arrangements characterized by strong employment protection enable workers to better defend 
their interests, most notably by limiting the managerial prerogative to adjust employment 
levels via strategies of external flexibility (Goergen et al., 2013; OECD, 2013). The 
institutions governing job security shape managerial ability to determine who is recruited and 
laid off. In turn, institutional constraints placed on the managerial prerogative to use labour 
reduce their ability to redistribute resources to shareholders (Roe, 2000). As a result, 
differences in institutional arrangements across national settings provide employees with 
diverging capabilities to moderate the impact of structural changes in the global economy 
against other actors, most notably shareholders, with different preferences regarding the 
governance of the corporation.  
         The case selection of France and the United Kingdom is well suited for integrating the 
insights of financialization and institutional approaches. In terms of research design, these 
two countries constitute most dissimilar systems as they sit at opposite ends of the European 
institutional spectrum regarding employment protection. The United Kingdom is 
characterized by institutional arrangements that place few restrictions on the managerial 
prerogative to dismiss employees. Compared to other European countries, the United 
Kingdom maintains only weak employment protection as measured by the costs of hiring 
new employees, size of severance payments, notice period for the initiation of collective 
dismissal procedures, and the legal recourse of employees against collective dismissals 
(Goergen et al., 2013; OECD, 2013). The heightened managerial ability to reorganise the 
workplace is further supported by now embedded Thatcher-era legislation. Successive pieces 
of legislation have reduced trade union power by imposing secret ballots to support industrial 
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action, placed restrictions on secondary picketing, and strongly diluted the constraining 
character of pre and post job-entry agreements for union membership (Davies and Freeland, 
2007; Howell, 2005). 
         France, in contrast, is characterized by restrictive institutional arrangements over the 
regulation of job security for both open-ended contracts and atypical employment. 
Employment protection for open-ended contracts is comparatively strong by European 
standards when strength is measured by the size of severance payments, notice period for the 
initiation of collective dismissal procedures, and the legal recourse available to employees in 
cases of collective dismissal (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2006; OECD, 2013). The 
French economy also exhibits extremely strict regulatory enforcement in the area of atypical 
employment, namely fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs (Venn, 2009). The use of part-
time contracts and fixed-term contracts is limited to specific situations, mainly the 
replacement of an employee who is absent and for unexpected increases in activities.  
         The selection of France and the United Kingdom provide informative settings to 
investigate the insights associated with integrating financialization and institutional 
approaches – the former focusing on the emergence of structural changes in the global 
economy that heightened financial considerations in the governance of the firm; the latter 
illuminating how these new pressures spread across national settings. Financialization 
approaches depart from the methodological framing of institutional approaches that explain 
observed variations in outcomes via the use of institutional differences. The expectation of 
financialization approaches is that the use of employee downsizing will be prominent in the 
governance of French and UK companies, i.e. two institutionally dissimilar business systems. 
From the perspective of institutional approaches, by contrast, the diffusion of financial 
considerations in the form of employee downsizing, a highly redistributive process, is likely 
to be more contested in France than in the United Kingdom given the presence of institutional 
differences in the use of layoffs (Goergen et al., 2013; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). 
 
Theory and Propositions: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Employee Downsizing 
in France and the United Kingdom 
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Our investigation focuses on the causal factors of large-scale layoffs in France and the United 
Kingdom between 2008 and 2013. From an ontological standpoint, our agument is embedded 
in the literature on complex causation whereby important events are not generated by the 
presence of one cause alone; but occur as the result of different configurations of specific 
conditions (Hall, 2003; Ragin, 1987; Thelen and Mahoney, 2015). Sensitivity to complex and 
historical specificities is unlikely to be achieved by single explanations that seek to identify 
the direct effects of a particular independent variable on employee downsizing (Mahoney, 
2004). Stand-alone explanations invariably fail to capture processes of causal complexity – 
especially in the context of diffusion across different business systems (Hall, 2003).  
         Our investigation is based on the use of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), 
the technique developed by Ragin (2000) to capture instances of causal complexity. 1  Built 
on the logic of Boolean algebra, a key strength of QCA is its combination of the strengths of 
both case-oriented research and quantitative research to capture how economic and social 
outcomes are generated by a configuration of factors, that is, complex causation (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). The analysis of causal complexity via the QCA method differs from 
statistical techniques as the impact of hypothesised independent variables on the dependent 
variable is not additive, but rather cumulative and interdependent (Mahoney, 2004; Ragin, 
1987). The QCA technique captures two forms of causal complexity: conjunctural causation 
and equifinality. 
         Conjunctural causation refers to how interactions among different factors generate a 
specific outcome that would not occur without the presence of all of these interacting factors 
(x1+x2+…xN y). In other words, individual hypothesized independent variables are 
necessary but not sufficient to produce a specific outcome (Mahoney, 2004: Ragin, 2000). 
Necessary but not sufficient conditions for downsizing illustrate that some specific outcomes 
are relatively more difficult to achieve since the occurrence of the value of interest on the 
dependent variable is contingent upon the presence of all hypothesised independent variables 
(Hall, 2003). 
                                                          
1 A growing number of scholars are being drawn to QCA as a methodology to capture processes of complex 
causation in diverse areas of employment relations such as customer abuse in service sectors (Korczynski and 
Evans, 2013); job security regulations in Europe (Emmenegger, 2011) and relative pay differences 
(Greckhamer, 2011). 
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         Equifinality, in contrast, captures the presence of different but functionally equivalent, 
and thus non-competing paths that secure a similar outcome (x1 or x2 or… xN  y) (Ragin, 
1987; Mahoney, 2004). In other words, hypothesized independent variables are sufficient but 
not necessary to produce a specific outcome. Sufficient but not necessary conditions for 
downsizing illustrate that some specific outcomes are relatively easier to achieve given the 
presence of several alternative paths to the occurrence of a similar outcome (Braumoeller, 
2003). Functionally equivalent paths reflect the presence of a greater range of possible 
courses of actions by which shareholder value practices spread across business systems. 
         The use of complexity provides a comprehensive understanding of important 
phenomenon in social sciences. Theoretically, our application of complex causation allows us 
to illustrate how institutional arrangements shape the diffusion of financialization 
considerations across national business systems. Social science research increasingly relies 
on the notion of causal complexity to explain important outcomes, but invariably fails to 
conceptualize the specific types of complexity required to generate a specific outcome in 
terms of the uneven distribution of necessary/sufficient conditions across settings (Mahoney, 
2008). By building on this observation, we argue that settings characterized by extensive 
institutional constraints, such as those in France, will require the presence of a greater number 
of ‘supporting’ factors for downsizing to occur. The incorporation of financial considerations 
in the governance of French companies is characterized by the presence of conjunctural 
causation whereby several factors interact together in order to overcome institutional barriers; 
and by the presence of a highly limited number, and constraining, set of scenarios of 
substitutability, thereby illustrating that employee downsizing is difficult to implement in 
France. In settings characterized by institutional permissiveness, such as the UK, our 
expectation is that the implementation of employee downsizing will result from significantly 
less demanding sets of factors. Therefore, our argument emphasizes how the presence of 
institutional diversity in employment protection in France and the UK points to different 
types of managerial challenge when financial considerations, such as the implementation of 
large-scale layoffs, are introduced into the strategic governance of companies. That is, 
different types of complex causation (necessary/sufficient conditions) will be needed to 
generate employee downsizing across institutionally dissimilar national business systems.   
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         We develop our conceptual framework empirically by testing the causal effect of three 
financialized variables from the literature on comparative corporate governance that are 
central to employee downsizing: financial leverage; categories of investors; and ownership 
structures of companies (see Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Brav et al., 2008; Gospel and 
Pendleton, 2014; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Roe, 2000).  
 
   
*Debt/Financial Leverage 
An important variable in empirical studies of employee downsizing is leverage (Cascio, 
1993; Datta et al., 2010). While the level of debt is not necessarily an indicator of poor 
performance, it does raise two issues with implications for the undertaking of employee 
downsizing across national business systems. The first one relates to the governance of the 
firm. High indebtedness could lead to a loss of control to creditors and/or increase the risks of 
bankruptcy (Bruslerie and Latrous, 2012). As a result, high debt generates strong incentives 
for corporate insiders, controlling shareholders and managers alike, to confront employees in 
order to extract concessions for avoiding the occurrence of these two scenarios (Bronars and 
Deere, 1991). In situations of high indebtedness, the bargaining power of employees might be 
reduced. Empirical studies across a range of institutionally dissimilar national business 
systems, characterized by varying regulations of employment termination, have documented 
that the implementation of large-scale layoffs is undertaken by companies with more 
extensive debt loads as compared to other domestic firms (Atanassov and Kim, 2009). In 
particular, strong employment protection is less effective in preventing large-scale layoffs in 
situations of high leverage (Atanassov and Kim, 2009). 
 
         The second issue associated with debt is the changed funding strategy of banks in many 
advanced capitalist economies, including France and the UK, that, in turn, impact on their 
ability to provide debt finance and roll over existing debt (Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield, and 
Verdun, 2013). An important, and traditional, function of banks is to serve an intermediary 
between household savers and non-financial corporations, which is to issue loans that are 
financed by relatively stable customer deposits. As a result of a series of changes that took 
place since the mid/late 1990s, by contrast, commercial banks have developed new series of 
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business activities that involves repacking pools of loans into tradable instruments, i.e. 
securitization. Moreover, these new banking activities are no longer exclusively financed by 
customer deposits, but entails recourse to borrowing from investors and other banks. Thus, 
banks increasingly faced a funding gap whereby customer deposits do not cover their lending 
activities. Prior to the advent of the 2008 financial crisis, the funding gap of commercial 
banks in France and the United Kingdom was significantly important, the two highest among 
the G5 countries, and exceed the ten percent figure (Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield, and Verdun, 
2013). 2 Moreover, this funding gap of banks was financed by relatively short-term sources 
from wholesale markets: French banks covered their funding gap via issue of short-term debt 
securities (Howarth, 2013) while UK banks exhibited strong reliance on borrowing from 
short-term driven inter-bank and commercial paper markets (Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield, and 
Verdun, 2013). The fragility of the funding activities of banks, in turn, has led to a severe 
tightening of their lending activities between 2008 and 2013 due to the cost and availability 
of funding, i.e. the credit crunch, as large commercial banks in the two countries scrambled to 
lower their reliance on external sources of funding (The Economist, 2013; Hardie, Howarth, 
Maxfield, and Verdun, 2013: 9). Non-financial companies with high leverage might face 
difficulties to refinance themselves given the financing constraints faced by commercial 
banks.  
         We investigate the impact of leverage on the undertaking of employee downsizing in 
France and the United Kingdom in the overall context of the credit crunch, whilst their 
respective regulation of employment dismissals is still characterized by significant 
institutional differences. Greater financial leverage enhances the bargaining position of 
management because the credible threat of bankruptcy or significant plant closures makes it 
easier to extract concessions from employees. This is likely to be an important factor in 
France given the presence of extensive institutional constraints that make it difficult to 
implement employee downsizing as an offensive strategic tool aimed at enhancing 
shareholder value. Thus, our expectation is that high financial leverage will constitute a 
necessary condition for the introduction of employee downsizing programmes in France 
(proposition 1). 
                                                          
2 The funding gap of banks is calculated as assets and loans/assets.  
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         By contrast, the United Kingdom exhibits comparatively weak employment protection 
where the governance of companies is shaped by the presence of institutional arrangements 
that heighten managerial ability to introduce downsizing in both favourable and adverse 
macroeconomic conditions (OECD, 2013). Thus, our expectation is that high financial 
leverage/debt, which increases the bargaining power of management vis-à-vis their 
employees, will not be needed and, therefore, will not constitute a necessary condition for the 
introduction of employee downsizing programs in the United Kingdom (proposition 2). 
 
 
*Categories of Investors and Employee Downsizing 
Financialized investors are important actors in contemporary capitalism which bring with 
them negative consequences for employment stability (Jacoby; 2005; van der Zwan, 2014: 
114-119). However, employee downsizing cannot be simply captured by the rise in practices 
emblematic of shareholder value in the strategic governance of the firm; it is, rather, 
contingent on specific categories of investors. Different categories of shareholder value 
driven investors – hedge funds, private equity, mutual funds, pension funds and sovereign 
wealth funds -- constitute sub-groups with different incentives. In turn these sub-groups are 
governed by particular internally defined rules -- that impact differentially on employment 
relations (Gospel and Pendleton, 2014:1-26). 
         Financialized investors -- hedge funds and private equity funds – constitute the most 
disruptive categories of investors for employment relations. Due to internal rules on trading 
and managerial remuneration schmes, these investors are driven by performance goals, not by 
diversification concerns, as fund managers are incentivized to secure the maximum possible 
absolute returns, not just achieve targeted mandated minimum returns (Goyer, 2006). Fund 
manager compensation derives from the amount of assets under management (1-2%) and, to a 
substantial extent, from incentive fees (usually 20% of profits) once a defined hurdle rate of 
return has been achieved. These more aggressive investor-owners are also characterized by 
short-term horizons especially hedge funds, as highlighted by their higher turnover rates of 
equity holding, and are more likely to target undervalued foreign companies whose market 
capitalization may increase following the implementation of  corporate restructuring policies 
(Brav et al. 2008). For these investors, shareholder activism is ex ante: they select companies 
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on the basis that their involvement as equity owners will trigger changes in corporate policies 
(Kahan and Rock, 2007).   
         Mutual funds, on the other hand, constitute an intermediary category of investor-owner 
whose economic incentives are very similar to those of ‘aggressive’ hedge funds, but whose 
mode of shareholder activism, if occurring at all, is ex post (Brav et al., 2008). Mutual fund 
managers are encouraged to surpass financial benchmarks (relative performance) as a result 
of variable pay incentives and greater liquidity concerns from savers whose investments are 
redeemable at any time. Finally, pension funds and sovereign wealth funds constitute long-
term investor-owners with low turnover rates of portfolio stocks and whose investment 
strategies and mode of governance are the least disruptive to employment relations (Goyer, 
2011: 51-70). Their long-term investment strategy results in risk diversification through 
investment in a large number of companies – although pension funds are outsourcing part of 
the management of their assets to more active investors. Moreover, financial incentives for 
fund managers are less imperative indicating that the size of the pool is limited by the current 
cohort of retirees. 
         In summary, investment funds exhibit variations in incentive sets for fund manager 
remuneration, length of investment horizons, and the extent to which the investment strategy 
is driven by performance concerns versus risk diversification. Our expectation is that the 
presence of pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, that is, investment funds which 
themselves are less financialized, will not constitute either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition in both France and the United Kingdom for the implementation of layoff schemes 
(Proposition 3). The mere presence of hedge funds and private equity investors, on the other 
hand, is insufficient to accurately predict outcomes across business systems. In France, 
aggressive rentier investor-owners face significant institutional constraints regarding their 
ability to secure the implementation of large scale downsizing. Our expectation is that the 
sole presence of hedge funds, mutual funds and private equity investors will not constitute a 
sufficient condition in itself for the introduction of employee downsizing programs in the 
institutionally constraining context of France (Proposition 4). 
  
*Ownership Structure of Companies 
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The ownership structure of listed companes has been identified as a central variable in the 
literature on comparative corporate governance in relation to the ability of managers to meet 
the demands of investors and implement shareholder value practices, such as employee 
downsizing, is shaped by the ownership structure of listed companies (Gourevitch and Shinn, 
2005; Roe, 2000). In liberal market economies, the ownership structure of listed companies is 
dispersed with shares being widely distributed. Non-liberal market economies, by contrast, 
are characterized by the presence of controlling shareholders with a large equity stake that 
enable them to shape the strategic direction of the firm. Variations in ownership structures 
matter for the implementation of shareholder value practices because the presence of a 
concentrated equity owner substantially reduces the effectiveness of shareholder activism by 
investors (Brav et al., 2008; Kahan and Rock, 2007). Put simply, institutional investors, who 
acquire only 5-20% of the equity stake of listed companies as minority shareholders, can be 
outvoted by the large controlling owner. 
         Building on this literature, we investigate whether, and how, the presence of ownership 
diffusion will be a favourable factor for the implementation of employee downsizing 
schemes. The ability of hedge funds and private equity funds to promote and secure 
employee downsizing is strengthened in the context of ownership diffusion because there is 
no insider owner with a concentrated equity stake that could outvote them. In the presence of 
ownership concentration, in comntrast, a large insider can always outvote aggressive 
shareholder activism. In the institutionally permissive context of the United Kingdom, we 
expect the presence of ownership diffusion to enable short-term investors to secure the 
implementation of employee downsizing. Thus, our expectation is that employee downsizing 
in the United Kingdom will not occur in the presence of ownership concentration 
(Proposition 5). In the French case, in contrast, the joint presence of financialized investors 
and ownership diffusion will not constitute a sufficient path by which employee downsizing 
occurs (Proposition 6). Leverage still matters in France (Proposition 1). 
  
                                                                 Methods 
We adopt the fuzzy sets variant of QCA (fsQCA) because it enables our variables to be 
captured through graded, but non-dichotomous, membership within a scale of 0 (full non 
membership) to 1 (full membership) (Ragin, 2000; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
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Dependent and independent variables are not always best measured in a dichotomous form, 
but are characterized by differences both in degrees and kinds. Hedge funds and sovereign 
wealth funds constitute categories of institutional investors that are located at each extreme of 
the spectrum regarding the extent to which they are potentially disruptive to employment 
relations but other categories of shareholders, such as mutual funds, are not. Therefore it is 
appropriate to code variables along a spectrum rather than in a dichotomous manner.    
      
         The use of the QCA set-theoretic method is associated with the coding of variables to 
the (relative) extent to which they fit into a ‘set’ or not with a defined concept of interest – 
employee downsizing in this article. This coding process is called calibration. In the earlier 
example, we investigate the extent to which institutional investors have incorporated the 
priorities of financialization because we hypothesize that a heightened focus on shareholder 
value results in higher recourse to employee downsizing. Therefore, hedge funds are 
calibrated with a fuzzy-set membership of 1 compared to 0.8, 0.6, 0.3, and 0.2 for private 
equity funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds respectively (see 
Table 1). This indicates that hedge funds and mutual funds, for instance, are both in the set of 
shareholders who are strongly driven by financialization concerns (a qualitative attribute), but 
hedge funds are more active in pressuring portfolio firms to implement downsizing schemes 
as compared to mutual funds (a quantitative difference). Sovereign wealth funds, on the other 
hand, are mostly out of this set. 
                                                  INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
  
The fsQCA method relies on the use of breakpoints, that is, coding differences along a 
spectrum, in the assignment of fuzzy-sets membership to each single case variable (see Table 
1). We used the “continuous” fuzzy-set scale (Ragin, 2008) to calibrate all our variables 
(except for leverage), based on the theoretical arguments described below. The three major 
breakpoints along this scale range from being fully in the set (1), undefined as being in or out 
of the set (0.5), and being fully out of the set (0). For leverage, we use the direct method of 
calibration, which is a built-in function of the fsQCA software to calibrate interval-scale data 
(Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Once the database sheet is uploaded onto the 
fsQCA software, and leverage is calibrated, the software is used to process the data and 
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generate the causal paths for necessity and sufficiency. Consistency and coverage thresholds 
are then defined to assess the significance of the results. 
         The calibration process operationalizes these variables into fuzzy-set membership 
scores and is detailed in Table 1. First, all cases of workforce reductions are included in our 
database for the sampled firms during the period under review. Substantial employee 
downsizing was classified as workforce reductions of 5% or more per annum, which is also in 
line with previous studies (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Munoz-Bullon and Sanchez-
Bueno, 2014). Our calibration framework thus distinguishes between substantial downsizing 
cases (where the outcome variable is coded as ‘1’) and other random reductions in the 
number of staff. Second, leverage was operationalized as the average of total debts over total 
capital for our two countries (Bessler et al., 2011). Single country coding of leverage is 
problematic given the presence of differences in the importance of bank financing among 
countries (Atanassov and Kim, 2009). Thus, we computed leverage by calculating the 
average of the total debt to total capital percentages of all sampled companies (56 for France 
and 57 for the United Kingdom) for the period under review divided by the number of years, 
that is, 6 years. Final leverage figures are 48% for France and 40% for the UK, hence an 
average of 44%. The qualitative breakpoints to code leverage using the direct method of 
calibration were defined around the average for both countries: cases with leverage 
percentages of 44% upwards were assigned a fuzzy-set membership of 1, cases at half this 
percentage, that is, 22%, were assigned a fuzzy-set membership value of 0.5 whilst cases with 
a leverage of 1% were completely out of the set with a membership of 0 (see Table 1). 
         Third, the calibration for ownership structure was taken from Gourevitch and Shinn 
(2005) and identifies specific thresholds for ownership diffusion (less than 5%) and the 
presence of an insider owner who can shape the strategy of the company (more than 20%) 
(see Table 1). Fourth, the calibration for investors is based on three criteria that highlight the 
extent to which they have incorporated shareholder value concerns at the expense of 
employee interests: financial incentives of fund managers, investment horizons and trading 
turnover of funds, and the extent to which their investment strategy is driven by performance 
concerns versus risk diversification (Gospel and Pendleton, 2014; Kahan and Rock, 2007). 
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Data and Samples 
Our sample comprises the largest stock market capitalisation in each country, the SBF120 for 
France and the FTSE 100 for the UK, as large firms are more likely to be targeted by 
shareholder value-driven investors (Brav et al., 2008). We selected companies that are/were 
members of either of these two indexes for at least two consecutive years from 2008 to 2013. 
We excluded financial companies, such as banks and insurance companies, since their 
leverage ratio and accounting practices are not comparable to non-financial companies 
(Atanassov and Kim, 2009). We also excluded companies with a dual class of shares that, 
effectively, provide (potential) equity-owners with only non-voting shares. Subsidiaries of 
foreign companies listed in London or Paris were also excluded. Our final sample is 
composed of 57 UK companies and 56 French firms. Company information was collected for 
the period 2008-2013 to assess the impact of the great financial crisis on the undertaking of 
employee downsizing in different institutional settings.  The dependent variable (employee 
layoffs) is operationalized as a five percent or more reduction in the number of employees 
from the previous year (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Munoz-Bullon and Sanchez-Bueno, 
2014). This information was collected from DataStream (2015). 
         Our three independent variables are measured in the following manner. Drawing 
from Atanassov and Kim (2009), we used total debts over total capital as a measurement of 
leverage. The amount of debt carried by companies provides insights on the incentives of 
corporate executives to secure concessions from employees. This information was also 
collected from DataStream (2015). Data on ownership structure and the presence of 
institutional investors was collected as follows. First, data on French companies were 
collected from annual company reports; from Dafsaliens (2008-2013), an annual publication 
on the ownership structure of listed companies; and from the database of the French Financial 
Supervisory Authority (AMF) which publishes on a daily basis the arrival and exit of major 
shareholders exceeding current disclosure requirements (3%) in listed companies. Second, 
data on UK companies were collected from annual reports and from the database of the 
Financial Times (FT 500, 2015) which provides a full list of past and current shareholders 
exceeding the disclosure requirements (3%). 
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Findings 
We highlight the importance of two key QCA concepts before the presentation of our results: 
consistency and coverage scores (Ragin, 2000). Consistency scores measure the degree to 
which a combination of causal conditions generates the phenomenon of interest on the 
dependent variable. That is, will the presence of a combination of conditions lead to the 
occurrence of the dependent variable? Coverage scores, in contrast, measure the extent to 
which a causal combination of conditions contributes to the occurrence of the outcome of 
interest on its own. That is, how much of the occurrence of the dependent variable is 
generated by the presence of the combination of conditions on the independent variable? 
High consistency and coverage scores reflect the causal importance of independent variables 
for generating an outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
         Our empirical results support our argument that the spread of employee downsizing to  
France is indeed occurring but is also characterized by an extensive and highly specific 
process of complex causation, whereas in the United Kingdom, the introduction of employee 
downsizing is more easily implemented. First, employee downsizing is roughly equivalent in 
the two countries despite the presence of substantial institutional differences. Our sample is 
composed of 57 UK companies and 56 French firms. In the United Kingdom, 66 instances of 
substantial employee downsizing (five percent of more in yearly reduction) took place from 
2008 to 2013. The corresponding figure for France was 57.  
         Second, high leverage is identified as a necessary condition in the undertaking of 
employee downsizing in France with a consistency of 0.92, thus exceeding the advisable 
threshold of 0.90 for tests of necessity (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The coverage value 
of 0.57 indicates high relevance. In other words, large scale layoffs in France occur only in 
the restrictive context of high leverage for the period under investigation. This is in sharp 
contrast to the United Kingdom and the United States where downsizing is often used as a 
tool to boost share price irrespective of macroeconomic conditions (Farber and Hallock, 
2009). This outcome suggests the importance of the constraining institutional arrangements 
of employment protection in France and is consistent with proposition 1. 
         Third, the presence of three variables -- high leverage, highly aggressive investors and 
ownership diffusion – constitutes a sufficient path to trigger employee downsizing in France. 
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The consistency score for this combination of conditions is 0.78, which is above the 
minimum threshold of 75% prescribed by Schneider and Wagemann (2012) for tests of 
sufficiency. In other words, in 78 percent of the cases where this combination of conditions 
was present, employee downsizing was high. This solution path also had a coverage value of 
0.40 which is in line with previous studies (Greckhamer, 2011; Korczynski and Evans, 2013), 
meaning that 40% of total instances of downsizing occurred precisely because of this 
combination of conditions. In other words, the occurrence of employee downsizing in France 
reflects the presence of a perfect storm of a combination of conditions whereby the absence 
of any of these factors would remove the sufficient character of this path to employee 
downsizing. This result is consistent with propositions 1, 3, 4, and 6. 
         Fourth, the United Kingdom illustrates the presence of significantly less demanding 
conditions for the implementation of employee downsizing. No necessary conditions were 
identified for downsizing. With regard to sufficient pathways for downsizing, the most 
powerful combination of conditions is ownership diffusion combined with the presence of 
highly aggressive short-term oriented investors, with a consistency value of 0.75 and a 
coverage value of 0.65. Empirical results for the United Kingdom are consistent with 
propositions 2, 3 and 5. These outcomes suggest the greater ability of highly financialized 
investors (hedge funds and private equity funds) to secure a favourable outcome in the 
presence of ownership diffusion, that is, in the context whereby no shareholder owns a 
controlling equity stake. In particular, hedge funds and private equity funds seek to secure 
significant employee downsizing programs even in the absence of high leverage. 
 
                                                  Discussion and Conclusion 
An important theoretical contribution of this article is that the implementation of employee 
downsizing schemes is appropriately explained by the integration of two theoretical 
approaches: structurally-based financialization and mid-range institutional perspectives. 
Structurally oriented financialzation approaches significantly contribute to our understanding 
of employee downsizing by incorporating important developments in the global economy. 
Financialization approaches have successfully develop a conceptualization of finance beyond 
its traditional intermediary function. Financialization is not about the provision of funding 
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whether stock market finance (Engelen and Konings, 2010) or bank loans (Hardie, Howarth, 
Maxfield, and Verdun, 2013) as reflected in the selection of our three financialized firm-level 
variables. Our focus on listed companies illustrates that the rise of shareholder value driven 
financialized investors, and the growing ownership diffusion of shares, do not bring 
additional funds to companies because these transactions occurred in the form of secondary 
trading for already existing securities (Kahan and Rock, 2007; Brav et al., 2008). Leverage, 
on the other hand, has become more problematic in the context of the credit crunch whereby 
banks are more reluctant to roll over existing debts and/or provide new loans (Hardie, 
Howarth, Maxfield, and Verdun, 2013).  
          Indeed, financialization approaches illustrate how the governance of companies is 
increasingly more about the distribution of resources in society. The widespread, and roughly 
equivalent use of large-scale layoffs in France and the United Kingdom highlights the 
importance of structural changes in the global economy despite the presence of institutional 
diversity. So while institutional arrangements governing employee dismissals beyond liberal 
market economies have formally remained stable (OECD, 2013), their influence over 
outcomes has diminished, even in the institutionally constraining setting of France, as a result 
of how new structural developments that influence strategic bargaining among different 
actors at firm-level. Yet, this new financial environment does not constitute a stable growth 
trajectory as resources generated by large-scale layoffs are not reinvested in the company in 
contrast to institutionalized compromises under Fordism between managers and employees 
(Clark, 2011; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014).  
         In terms of mid-range institutional approaches, our investigation highlights the 
importance of institutions in structuring the diffusion of new practices beyond  liberal market 
economies while also taking issue with a tendency in the literature that reify institutional 
frameworks. Moving beyond a deterministic understanding of institutions, whereby outcomes 
are simply ‘read off’ from the constellation of prevailing institutional arrangements, we 
highlight two novel contributions that illustrate how similar institutions can lead to different 
outcomes while, at the same time, retaining the theoretical importance of institutional 
approaches as mid-range theory. First, the causal influence of (individual) institutional 
arrangements is contingent upon the specific characteristics of the complex causation settings 
 21 
 
in which they are embedded. Similar institutions can lead to different outcomes since they 
can generate the outcome of interest on the dependent variable as part of a specific 
intersection of necessary but not sufficient conditions or via different but functionally 
equivalent paths (sufficient but not necessary). For instance, private equity and hedge funds 
in the United Kingdom are able to secure employee downsizing in the presence of ownership 
diffusion and, moreover, without needing high leverage as a causal factor. In France, in 
contrast, employee downsizing occurs in the more restrictive context of financialized 
investors, ownership diffusion and high leverage.  
         Our second contribution on mid-range institutional approaches illustrates how the use of 
employee downsizing spreads across different settings via the presence of different types of 
complex causation. Our argument builds upon a number of studies, especially in economic 
sociology, that illustrate the importance of the local context (institutional bricolage, 
institutional legitimacy) for the diffusion of practices beyond their original setting (Campbell, 
2004). The innovative aspect of our contribution to this debate suggests that different 
configurations of institutional arrangements will require different types of complex causation 
for a common outcome to occur across dissimilar business systems (Goyer, 2011: 106-128). 
That is, diversity in institutional arrangements accounts for the uneven distribution of 
necessary/sufficient conditions between cases. By comparing an institutionally constraining 
setting with a more permissive one, our findings illustrate that more exhaustive sets of factors 
will be needed in the former in order to generate a functionally equivalent outcome. For 
instance, the spread of financialization to France, a non-liberal market economy, took place 
as a result of a confluence of two exhaustive factors: leverage as a necessary condition 
(proposition 1) and the joint presence of high leverage, financialized investors, and ownership 
diffusion as a sufficient condition (propositions 1, 3, 4 and 6). In the United Kingdom, by 
contrast, the implementation of downsizing operates independently of leverage (proposition 
2) and, moreover, the less exhaustive configuration of short-term investors and ownership 
diffusion is sufficient to trigger employee downsizing (proposition 5). 
         The managerial implications of our study illustrate that while downsizing pressures 
associated with financialization are likely to be present beyond liberal market economies, 
their undertaking is contingent upon a confluence of two or more favourable factors. 
Managerial strategies based on the use of large-scale layoffs, such as a focus on core 
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competencies and post-acquisition re-structuring, need to incorporate factors that are often 
part of the background environment in liberal market economies. For instance, permissive 
institutional arrangements for employee dismissals and the overall preponderance of patterns 
of ownership diffusion constitute ‘constant’ variables that are not usually taken into account 
by managers in liberal market economies in the implementation of employee layoffs (Brav et 
al., 2008). It is clear, however, that the extent and depth of these pressures measured across 
our three criteria is less evident in France than convergence arguments focussed on the global 
diffusion of shareholder capitalism might suggest.  
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Table 1. Variables and the fsQCA Calibration 
Variable (and label) Definition for calibration 
Role in theoretical 
model 
Percentage of 
downsizing 
Calibration 
gradations 
Scale & 
Breakpoints 
Downsizing 
(downs) 
According to Munoz-Bullon and Sanchez-
Bueno (2014), and Ahmadjian and Robbins 
(2005), a 5% reduction in staff within one 
year represents a major reduction in the 
workforce. This goes beyond 
random fluctuations in the number of 
employees, or incremental adjustments in 
the employment level. 
Outcome variable  
0% 0 
 
 
"Continuous" 
fuzzy set scale 
(Ragin, 2008) 
 
0: Fully out of 
the set 
 
0.1 - 0.4: Mostly 
out of the set 
 
0.5:   
Cross-over; 
neither in nor 
out of the set 
 
0.6 - 0.9: Mostly 
in the set 
 
1: Fully in the 
set 
 
 
 
 
1% 0.1 
2% 0.2 
3% 0.3 
4% 0.4 
4.5% 0.5 
5% 1 
Variable (and label) Definition for calibration 
Role in theoretical 
model 
Types of institutional 
investors 
Calibration 
gradations 
Category of 
Institutional 
Investors 
(investor) 
Investment funds exhibit variations in 
financial incentives for manager 
remuneration, length of investment horizons, 
and the extent to which the investment 
strategy is driven by performance concerns 
versus risk diversification (Brav et al. 2008; 
Gospel and Pendleton, 2014).  
The extent to which 
institutional 
investors focus on 
shareholder value 
maximisation 
strategies heighten 
their preferences for 
the implementation 
of employee 
downsizing 
schemes. 
No investor present 
 
0 
Sovereign Wealth 
Fund 
0.2 
Pension Fund 0.3 
Mutual Fund 0.6 
Private Equity 0.8 
Hedge Fund 1 
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Variable (and label) Definition for calibration 
Role in theoretical 
model 
Types of ownership 
structure 
Calibration 
gradations 
Scale & 
Breakpoints 
Ownership Structure 
- France 
(ownstruc1) 
- UK 
(ownstruc2) 
Firms across national business are 
characterised by differences in ownership 
structures, thereby reflecting the influence of 
insider-owners over firm strategy 
(Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Roe, 2000). 
The ownership 
structure of the firm 
shapes the extent to 
which institutional 
investors can 
influence 
management 
regarding the 
implementation of 
employee 
downsizing 
schemes.   
Fully Concentrated 0 
"Continuous" 
fuzzy set scale 
(Ragin, 2008) 
 
0: Fully out of 
the set 
 
0.1 - 0.4: Mostly 
out of the set 
 
0.5:   
Cross-over; 
neither in nor 
out of the set  
 
0.6 - 0.9: Mostly 
in the set 
 
1: Fully in the 
set 
Medium Concentration 0.6 
Diffused 1 
Variable (and label) Definition for calibration 
Role in theoretical 
model 
Percentage of 
leverage 
Calibration 
gradations 
Scale & 
Breakpoints 
Leverage 
- France 
(levcal1) 
- UK 
(levcal2) 
According to Atanassov and Kim (2009), 
firm-level debt volume influences 
the undertaking of restructuring decisions as 
highly leveraged firms are more likely to 
implement employee downsizing schemes. 
Martin and Baker (2011) calculated leverage 
as the percentage of total debt to capital. 
High debt increases 
the risk of default in 
times of financial 
difficulties, thus 
increasing the 
probability of 
restructuring 
activities like 
layoffs to pay back 
debts. 
0-100% 
1% - 0 
22% - 0.5 
44% - 1 
Direct method of 
calibration 
(Ragin, 2008) 
 
0: Fully out of 
the set 
 
0.5:   
Cross-over; 
neither in nor 
out of the set 
 
1: Fully in the 
set 
 
